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## 3. POLISH RADIO SAYS ROKOSSOWSKI PLANNED SWEEPING PURGE

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According to a Warsaw radio broadcast on 26 October, a pro-Soviet group, led by Marshal Rokossowski and several politburo members, attempted to arrest large numbers of liberal Communists shortly before the recent central committee plenum. The broadcast quoted a speaker at the meeting of the Gdansk

Provincial Committee of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party as stating that the pro-Soviet group issued orders to the army to arrest 700 liberal Communist leaders on 18 October, the day before Khrushchev arrived in Warsaw. The move was unsuccessful because of the actions of "progressive elements" in the army, security policy, party, and among the workers who alerted those scheduled to be arrested and seized control of key positions in the city.

The speaker named Marshal Rokossowski, Zenon Nowak, Klosiewicz, Berman, General Witaszewski, Joswiak-Witold, and Zawadski, as members of the group, known as the "Natolin group."

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Comment

This information probably has some foundation in fact and provides an explanation for for the unexpected arrival of Soviet leaders in Warsaw on 19 October and the coldness of their reception. In view of its publication, Rokossowski can hardly retain his posts as deputy premier

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and minister of national defense. He is now "on leave" and reportedly has gone to the USSR with no date set for his return. Most of the other listed members of the Natolin group have already been removed from office, along with eight provincial first secretaries, but Zenon Nowak still holds the post of deputy premier and Zawadski retains his posts as chief of state and politburo member.

The publicizing of the activities of the Natolin group also suggests that some members of the group may not only be deprived of their positions but may be subjected to criminal prosecution as well.

#### 5. SOVIET DECLARATION ON RELATIONS WITH THE SATELLITES

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The Soviet government's declaration of 30 October on relations with the Satellites is an attempt to regain a position from which the USSR can begin to exert control over the too-rapid development of Satellite

independence without compromising its self-initiated "liberalization" program. The declaration attempts to cancel out the serious loss of prestige and leadership which the USSR has suffered, both within and outside the bloc, because of events in Hungary and Poland.

In a key paragraph, the declaration emphasizes that Soviet units are stationed in Hungary and Rumania under the authority of the Warsaw pact, and carefully establishes that Soviet troops in Poland are there on the basis of the Potsdam four-power agreement as well. East Germany and the Soviet forces there are pointedly omitted from the statement, a tacit reaffirmation of the Soviet position that withdrawal of any of these troops is dependent on withdrawal of Western forces from Germany, US forces from Europe, and a change in the orientation of West Germany.

While the declaration holds out the promise to the Satellites of greater internal independence in economic affairs and withdrawal of Soviet advisers, it also places great emphasis on the Warsaw pact as a unifying system necessary to protect and maintain Communist control. In stating that it "is ready to examine with other socialist countries" the stationing of Soviet troops on their territory, the declaration asserts that this should take place only with the agreement of the state concerned as well as agreement between participants in the pact. In its specific references to the Hungarian situation, the statement also implies that withdrawal of Soviet troops is subject to negotiations with "other participants of the Warsaw treaty" as well as the local government.

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### 6. TITO URGES HUNGARIANS TO SUPPORT NAGY

25X1A	the "genuine socia	Tito, in a letter of 29 October addressed to the Hungarian Communist Party, calls for the Hungarians to stop further bloodshed. He says that the recent measures taken by the Hungarian leadership show the Hungarian party and government and alist aspirations of the Hungarian working merged into one."	
	present crisis, be	Tito regrets the "wrong and harmful policy" st Hungarian regime which produced the ut calls on the Hungarian workers to avoid faith of workingmen in socialism and the ment of socialist gemocracy."	
	but out of a feelin ist aspirations'' o to make every eff	The letter says the Yugoslav leadership nterfere in the internal affairs of Hungary, g of solidarity with the "progressive socialfithe Hungarian people, appeals to the people ort to end the struggle, "which could have sequences not only for Hungary but for the r movement."	
	Comment self as well as a l Gomulka and Cyra	Tito's remarks closely parallel the line now being pushed by the Nagy regime it-Polish statement to the Hungarians sent by ankiewicz.	
		The Yugoslavs are apparently worried lest the present Hungarian rebellion lead to either government in Hungary or to Soviet imposi-	25X1A

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tion of a Stalinist-type regime.

#### 7. WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REACTION TO HUNGARIAN REVOLT

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Communist reaction in major Western European countries to the Hungarian revolt ranges from rigid support of Moscow by the French to an increasingly anti-Soviet position in Italy.

The American embassy in Paris reports that on 29 October the French Communist press surpassed itself in defending the Soviet Union and gloating over the "defeat" of the insurgents.

The London Daily Worker, on the other hand, has walked a tight rope in both ab-

horring the "necessity" for the intervention of Soviet troops against the counterrevolutionaries and in speaking of the Hungarian workers' "just demands."

The official Italian Communist Party paper Unita has abandoned its earlier support of the Soviet line blaming counterrevolutionaries for the violence. On 29 October party leader Togliatti criticized Hungary for its failure to develop its Communism on an adequate national base and to make reforms quickly enough. The leadership of the Communistdominated labor organization and the fellow-traveling Il Paese have condemned Soviet intervention in Hungary.

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	9. GOVERNMENT PRESSES ITS ADVANTAGE IN SINGAPORE
25X1A	Rioting in Singapore has ceased and the curfew and other emergency restrictions are being lifted. The government is in complete command of the situation and the police and army are on the alert to meet any new outbreak.
	The government is pressing its advantage, despite protests from some highly influential Chinese. The Council of Ministers has rejected a so-called compromise proposal by Tan Lark-sye, a Peiping-oriented businessman who speaks for some elements of the Chinese community which have opposed the government's action. Chief Minister Lim has delivered a strong radio address blaming the pro-Communists for the disturbances and appealing to all Chinese to support his "indigenous" government.

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# 10, SECRETARY GENERAL OF NORTH VIETNAM'S COMMUNIST PARTY OUSTED

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Truong Chinh, secretary general of the Lao Dong Party (Communist) and its predecessors since 1941, and heretofore regarded as probably second man in the Viet Minh hierarchy, has resigned after

criticizing himself for the "mistakes committed in land reform." Peasant discontent over the land reform program, heightened by famine conditions resulting from poor crops since 1954, culminated recently in open violence, according to Radio Hanoi.

Chinh has been replaced by Ho Chi Minh, who retains his post as party chairman. Although Chinh has been made the scapegoat for land reform failures, he remains a member of the politburo and the secretariat and is apparently not marked for discard.

Ho Chi Minh's assumption of the post of secretary general suggests an effort to use his great popularity to gain wider peasant support for the land reform program. To conciliate the peasants, the change may also lead to a slowing down and modification of the program.

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# THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 0200, 31 October)

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